*written by Artyom Davtyan
The South China Sea, with its territorial disputes and rivalries, is undoubtedly one of the world’s most contentious places. The People’s Republic of China and its Communist Party are at the heart of the issues. The “U-shaped line,” also known as the “nine-dotted line” and formerly the “eleven-dotted line,” is essential to China’s involvement in the Asiatic Mediterranean, and more especially the South China Sea. This line was formulated prior to Mao Zedong establishing the still-existing communist state.
Since Japan’s defeat in 1945, which brought the Second World War to an end in the Pacific Ocean, the South China Sea and the region including East and Southeast Asia have seen a significant shift in the balance of power. The People’s Republic of China is the developing force competing for dominance in the area. Between territorial conflicts and large amounts of oil and natural gas, the South China Sea has become a hotly disputed zone in which the powerful try to impose their will while the less powerful refuse to give up on their claims.
In terms of the regional and global balance of power, China appears to be the leading candidate for the amount of influence that the US has had since the Cold War’s conclusion. China intends to consolidate what is immediately beyond its borders. Then it will concentrate on obtaining
control of its surroundings, maybe as far as the second island chain, which stretches from Japan’s southeastern beaches southward through Guam, which is home to a US military post. China will also pursue a more beneficial balance of power well beyond its borders, all while avoiding the
position of hegemon and assuring that no single other state can beat them in battle. According to this hypothesis, China would reduce American supremacy in the area by capturing critical chokepoints and eventually reaching beyond the Asiatic Mediterranean to undermine the role
that the US Navy may play internationally.
The strategic significance of the Paracel and Spratly Islands must be studied within the context of China’s outward drive and borderline expansionism. While they are only a piece of the puzzle
in the region intended at keeping Chinese aspirations in the Pacific and beyond at bay, the nature of the tensions surrounding the island groupings makes them particularly important and topical.
In order to establish a causal relationship between China’s expansive goals and their operations in the South China Sea, it is crucial to recognize the relative power position that they enjoy in this zone, which the West has long acknowledged to be an effective buffer to keep China at arm’s
length.The fundamental reason why the PRC may seek natural resources in the South China Sea with relative impunity is the tremendous leverage it has over ASEAN members as the latter’s principal trading partner, as well as China’s role as the neighborhood’s big power.
Finally, China’s proclivity to do as it pleases may be driven, as claimed in this study, by an endeavor to consolidate the Asiatic Mediterranean as the outer-rim of the country’s coastlines on the Eurasian rimland. The South China Sea, as well as the first and second island chains, have become buffer zones, used by Western nations to limit China to its local littoral region. The PRC has recently extended its territories in the South China Sea and grown its fleet to the point where it can directly threaten Indonesia and Malaysia from its airfields in the Spratly Islands.
These trends have not gone unnoticed by America’s authorities, who said in 2015 that “by 2020, the navy and air force plan to base 60% of their forces in the Asia-Pacific region.” Securing the integrity of the first island chain and minimizing the Chinese threat in the Asiatic Mediterranean is heavily dependent on the PRC’s adversaries in the region, the most important of which is Taiwan.
Chinese actions in the Asiatic Mediterranean have left their nation less accessible to prospective adversaries. In the process, China has inevitably moved to undercut the US’s ability to operate freely in its backyard. The region’s oil and gas reserves are significant because they might drive
China’s rapid development. However, they, along with the Spratly and Paracel Islands, are minor features in China’s wider strategy of dominance and control in and around the South China Sea.
China’s considerable might makes it difficult for smaller governments in the area to respond effectively, which may only empower the PRC to pursue an expansion of its empire state masquerading as a nation-state. Every year, around $3.4 trillion in trade passes through the South China Sea, accounting for approximately one-third of global maritime trade in various regions of the region. This region has significant crude oil and natural gas minerals beneath the seafloor, as well as vast fishing grounds. However, the South China Sea presents various obstacles, including dangerous circumstances, choke spots such as straits and reefs, smuggling operations, and separatist movements. Furthermore, the political boundaries of the bordering coastal nations complicate the problem, with seven countries asserting overlapping maritime claims in the area.
The People’s Republic of China stands out among these claims because it not only challenges the territorial waters claimed by its neighbours but also tries to impose its influence over the states surrounding the South China Sea. Unlike in other parts of the world, the sea is the principal mode of communication and transportation in Southeast Asia, as the hinterlands are frequently outside the jurisdiction of government. Securing commercial routes, maintaining port facilities, and exerting military rights over these waterways are therefore critical for establishing prosperity and security.
Beijing’s territorial claims in the South China Sea are based on a controversial map known as the nine-dash line, which dates back to the 1940s. This U-shaped demarcation line encompasses nearly 90% of the South China Sea and reaches as far as 2000 kilometres from the Chinese
mainland. Surprisingly, the bordering coastal states vigorously oppose China’s claim.
The Asiatic Mediterranean is the People’s Republic’s only connection to the Pacific and Indian oceans, and hence to the rest of the world’s deep blue seas. Because these oceans are separated from China’s seas by islands belonging to other states, critical chokepoints, such as the Strait of
Malacca, stand in the way of China’s unhindered access to waters beyond the Asiatic Mediterranean. China’s aggressive expansion in the region, pushed America to retain a military presence with bases in the region.The Chinese mainland’s somewhat exposed position outside the
Asiatic Mediterranean plainly offers an incentive to compete for control of the surrounding waters, and, with time, even beyond. As a result, the South China Sea, with its Paracel and Spratly Islands, appears to be an excellent buffer between external threats and China’s mainland.
Control of the South China Sea would also allow Beijing to push its might further south and west, towards the Indian Ocean. China’s most direct route to the Pacific Ocean is via the Bashi Channel, which connects the Philippines and Taiwan, and the Miyako Strait, which connects
Japan and Taiwan.
Although not formally defined, this initial island chain is recognized to include “the islands stretching from the Kurils, the Japanese home islands, and the Ryukyus to Taiwan, the Philippines, and Indonesia.” If China aspires to spread its worldwide influence, it must first break through this initial island chain. China aspires to establish a ‘outer rim’ in order to strengthen the security of its continental rimland. The seas of the Asiatic Mediterranean are seen as the outside rim here, and possibly more ambitiously, the first island chain itself.
In 2013, China initiated a large-scale reclamation campaign in seven areas in the South China Sea’s thinly populated islands. This is the most contentious area, as the Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, and even Taiwan all claim it. The claims of the latter are similar to those of China. Beijing policymakers claim the Spratly islands for their rich fishing grounds and considerable hydrocarbon reserves. There is enough crude oil and natural gas to last China’s industry for decades. As a result, China got to work, and by 2016, it had already recovered nearly 3200 acres of land atop seven partially submerged reefs in the Spratly Islands.
This generated political anxiety in the region, and it was followed by intense talks between Beijing and Washington, which resulted in the cancellation of the reclamation effort. Nonetheless, it did not prevent China from establishing military bases on previously recaptured
territory. The Chinese military has built massive naval, aviation, and missile systems on the seven islands throughout the years. The specifics are unknown, but it is assumed that the islands of Fiery Cross Mischief and Subi currently have advanced air defence systems, as well as
barracks, helipads, runways, and hangars large enough to house dozens of jets. Furthermore, Fiery Cross has a deep water port where huge boats may dock, and comparable ports are presently being built on Subi and Mischief.
The smaller islands each include radar facilities, bunkers, and supply platforms. These islands, when combined, operate as aircraft carriers, pushing force outward. China’s Coast Guard and Maritime militia utilise non-naval boats like as container ships and fishing vessels to harass
foreign ships under the guise of plausible deniability. It’s an ideology that makes the neighbours think twice before entering. This strategy stops short of developing into a military war. China’s growing influence has an impact on periphery nations such as India, Japan, and Australia, all of whom want to guarantee their access to South China Sea. As an island nation with limited natural resources, Japan has concerns in the region.
This is an important consideration for Beijing since, unlike the internationally committed Washington, the Japanese will concentrate solely on their Chinese adversaries. The Paracel Islands are a series of reefs located about 320 kilometres south-east of Hainan Island. China,
Taiwan, and Vietnam all claim it. Beijing’s ambitions are more evident since the Paracel Islands provide a protective layer for Hainan Island, which houses the Chinese nuclear submarine force.
More crucially, whoever controls the Paracel Islands and Hainan Island at the same time will obtain the potential to cripple Vietnam by targeting the small annamese range that effectively divides the nation in two.
For centuries, Vietnam has stood in the way of China’s drive for regional hegemony. If Beijing can defeat Hanoi by controlling the Paracel Islands, it will have won the war. That appears to be what China is aiming for. The Chinese maintain a presence on eight of the Paracel Islands,
including the largest military facility on Woody Island, where over 1400 military personnel operate radar facilities. Woody Island also serves as China’s administrative capital of all the claimed island groups in the South China Sea. China has worked to normalise its presence on Woody Island by conducting daily civilian flights to the island, encouraging tourism activities, and even organising weddings since 2016. By putting a civilian component to the island, Beijing seeks to portray the region as a real island with its own economic life. The ultimate objective is
to establish an exclusive economic zone around Woody Island. The Scarborough Shoal is a triangle-shaped chain of underwater rocks and reefs. Because of its closeness, it was governed by the Philippines until China took possession forcibly in 2012. The Scarborough Shoal has been a
source of tension between Beijing and Manila since that time. Initially, Filipino leaders anticipated their American colleagues to protect the area, as required by the Philippines-US defence pact.
However, the Obama administration preferred to protest verbally rather than confront China over its possession of the Scarborough Shoal. That’s what occurred in the Philippines.
Understandably, since the turn of events, ties between Manila and Washington have deteriorated significantly, and the Filipino leadership has turned to China to create a new understanding.
China obtained complete resource extraction and fishing rights, as well as signing hundreds of agreements pledging infrastructure projects in the Philippines.
However, Beijing still has no military installations on the Scarborough Shoal. The problem is that the reef chain is around 350 kilometres from Manila. A Chinese military base on the Scarborough Shoal would threaten Manila and elicit a ferociously severe response from the Philippines, maybe driving the Philippines back into America’s arms. China’s position on the
Scarborough Shoal is only for the purpose of protecting access to the Pacific. A chain of tiny islands, stretching from Japan to Indonesia, borders the eastern margin of the South China Sea.
Control of the first island chain is essential for Chinese military authorities if the country is to have any pre-emptive choices in times of confrontation. The contentious nine dash line is loosely based on the first island chain and so indicates its historical significance. The Philippines is the
only state along the island chains that may be subjugated or compelled into entering into a political pact. As a result, China utilises its position on the Scarborough Shoal to quietly influence the Philippines’ behaviour and secure access to the Pacific. However, the reef chain is likely to remain a demilitarised zone for the foreseeable future.
Despite the informal agreement, the Philippine government took the Chinese state to The Hague’s Permanent Court of Arbitration in 2016, which provides services to resolve disputes
under international treaties between governments. During the tribunal hearings, the court relied to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea to define an island. According to the convention’s Article 121, an island is a naturally formed portion of land surrounded by water that
is above water at high tide. Furthermore, an island must be capable of supporting human settlement or economic life.
The Chinese lawyers used Woody Island and its 1400 military troops as evidence of human occupancy and commercial activities. The court, on the other hand, found that economic and human activity were maintained by the continuing flow of goods from outside. As a result, the
seven Chinese holdings on the Sparkling islands did not fulfil the legal definition of an island.
The regions were instead classified as rocks or low tide elevations.
This has significant legal ramifications since rocks and low tide levels confer distinct rights than islands. The most significant legal distinction is that only an island has an exclusive economic zone that stretches out into the sea for 370 kilometres beyond the territorial and contiguous zone.
The state has complete authority over economic resources such as fishing, mining, and oil exploration inside that region, however freedom of navigation is maintained. China rejects the Hague decision, claiming that its South China Sea holdings are islands with a complete 22-
kilometer territorial sea and a 37i-kilometer exclusive economic zone.
This is when the United States enters the conversation. For the United States Navy, freedom of navigation, sometimes known legally as innocent passage, is linked to America’s capacity to project force overseas. The South China Sea handles about 40% of China’s entire trade, including
the majority of its energy imports. The US Navy may impose its rules on Chinese boats passing through the area. Such an imposition will devastate China’s economy and cause civil unrest throughout the country over time. Obviously, such an act would be detrimental to the world
economy. As a result, it’s a deterrent strategy that harms both the attacker and the defender
However, the strategy will only be effective as long as freedom of passage in the South China Sea is maintained. Without freedom of navigation, American legislators would be forced to redraw the geopolitical balance with China. In this context, the US Navy defends its interests
through freedom of navigation operations. These are naval manoeuvres that establish legal precedents and either support or contest maritime claims. Innocent passage is defined under the Law of the Sea as the transit of a warship from one nation into the territorial seas of another, with
the condition that the transit vessel refrain from military research, surveillance, and survey activities.
The transit vessel is also required to travel constantly and promptly across the territorial seas.
So, for the last several years, the US Navy has been sailing its boats in a zigzag pattern through the waterways of the tiny islands, rather than constantly and promptly as necessary in an innocent voyage. The Americans make it clear that they do not consider the waters surrounding the Sparkly islands to constitute Beijing’s exclusive economic zone. Meanwhile, the Chinese navy follows the American boats, demanding that they leave China’s exclusive economic zone in order to create their own precedent.
This chess game has been going on for a long time, but it also illustrates the irony of tremendous powers. Although the US is not a signatory to the Law of the Sea, it attempts to impose international norms on everyone else. At the same time, China recognises the pact yet flagrantly breaches its terms. It merely goes to show that in geopolitics, the powerful have the ability to bend and break the rules.